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This paper combines a literature overview of existing literature in game-theoretic 
pragmatics, with new models that fill some voids in the literature. We start with an 
overview of signaling games with a conflict of interest between sender and receiver, 
and show that the literature on such games can be classified into models with direct, 
costly, noisy and imprecise signals. We then argue that this same subdivision can be 
used to classify signaling games with common interests, where we fill some voids in 
the literature. For each of the signaling games treated, we show how equilibrium-
refinement arguments and evolutionary arguments can be interpreted in the light of 
pragmatic inference. 
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It is safe to say that the use of game theory has become more common within the field of 
pragmatics. While such game-theoretic pragmatics focuses specifically on signaling games, 
the field lacks an overview of the signaling games to which pragmatics can be applied. This is 
not a surprise, as such overviews of signaling games are lacking in game theory itself. The 
purpose of this article is two-fold. The first purpose is to provide an overview of the different 
signaling games to which pragmatics can be applied. As game theory and in particular 
economics has mostly been interested in conflicts of interest, we start by giving an overview 
of the different types of signaling games involving a conflict of interest treated in the 
literature. We identify direct signaling games, costly signaling games, noisy signaling games 
and imprecise signaling games. Each time, the purpose of these games is to show how the use 
of signals of a particular form can solve the conflict of interest between sender and receiver, 
in ensuring that the receiver finds the sender’s signals credible in spite of the conflict of 
interest between them. 
Yet, given Grice’s (1967) cooperative principle, pragmatics is more interested in signaling 
games with common interests. As we show, the four categories of direct signaling games, 
costly signaling games, noisy signaling games and imprecise signaling games are also very 
worthy of an analysis under common interests. This brings us to our second purpose, namely 
of filling some gaps in the literature. In particular, direct signaling games with common 
interests and noisy signaling games with common interests have to our knowledge not been 
treated in game-theoretic pragmatics, and we attempt to fill this gap. 
The common theme in the paper is that all of the signaling games have multiple Nash 
equilibria, and the question is whether we can find arguments in the literature on refinements 
of the Nash equilibrium so that only the efficient Nash equilibrium is selected. The most 
obvious way in which it is clear that there are multiple Nash equilibria is that all of the games 
we treat have both pooling equilibria, where the sender does not send any signals (or sends 
signals, but not in an informative manner) and the receiver does not obtain any information, 
and separating equilibria, where the sender does sender does send signals and where the 
receiver does receive information. The question arising then is: if the receiver expects that the 
pooling equilibrium will be played, but unexpectedly receives a certain signal, will the 
receiver make some inference that the signal could only have been sent by a particular player? 
This is the question arising when applying equilibrium refinements to signaling games. As 
this is also a question of pragmatic inference, game-theoretic pragmatics thus seems to 
coincide with such equilibrium refinement arguments. This is familiar for costly signaling 
games, but we will show that it also applies for direct, noisy, and imprecise signaling. We 
argue that these games can inspire the formulation of pragmatic rules that seem sensible. 
Less obviously, some of the games we treat have both efficient separating equilibria and 
inefficient separating equilibria. The question arises again whether equilibrium refinement 
arguments allow us to select against these inefficient separating equilibria. In general, the 
answer is positive for conflict-of-interest signaling games, but no for common-interest games. 
In this sense, in predicting efficient play, common-interest games are more problematic than 
conflict-of-interest games. This is because the typical argument in conflict-of-interest 
signaling games is that signals of a particular form can solve the conflict of interest. For 
instance, if a sender is biased to always report the same state of the world, this can be solved 
by sending a signal that is prohibitively costly to send in one of the states. Inefficiency can 
then arise because the same purpose can be achieved with a cheaper signal. But if a receiver 
can realize that a signal with a particular but high cost level is credible, then he will also 
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inefficient separating equilibria is not problematic. 
In common-interest games, however, typically in an inefficient separating equilibrium, there 
is a complete reversal of meaning compared to the efficient separating equilibrium. For 
instance, whereas in an efficient separating equilibrium a costly signal refers to an infrequent 
state, in an inefficient separating equilibrium it refers to a frequent state. Once sender and 
receiver play an inefficient separating equilibrium, we do not have arguments why they would 
move away from this equilibrium, exactly because this would require a complete reversal of 
meaning. We argue, however, that one should take as one’s starting point the pooling 
equilibrium. After all, if we want to understand how people learn to communicate, we must 
take as a starting point a situation where they do not communicate. The problem is that, unlike 
what is the case in conflict of interest games, equilibrium refinements in some cases predict 
that the inefficient separating equilibrium will be played. 
In Section 2, we present a general signaling model, of which all models treated in this paper 
are variants. Here, we also introduce the several equilibrium refinements that we treat in this 
paper. In Section 3, we treat direct, costly, noisy and imprecise signaling models for the case 
of a conflict of interest between sender and receiver. In Section 4, we treat the four 
corresponding signaling models when there are common interests between sender and 
receiver. We end with a discussion in Section 5. 
 
 
2. Workhorse model and equilibrium refinements 
 
The game has two players, namely the sender Z, and the receiver H. At stage 1 of the game, 
Nature decides which state from a set of states T   R M L , ,   occurs, with typical element 
labeled  T, where Nature’s choice is observed by Z but not by H. State T occurs with 
probability πT. If two states of the world are sufficient for our purposes, we will assume that 
0  R  . For brevity, we sometimes refer to a sender who observes state T as a sender of type 
T. 
At stage 2, for each state  , Z decides to send a signal from the set ST with 
typical element labeled ST. Any such set always includes the possibility for the sender of 
doing nothing, so of not sending any signals. The set of signals that the sender is able to send 
may differ between one state of the world to the other, in which case we have a revelation 
model of signaling, as signals may then directly reveal aspects of the state of the world, as 
certain signals can only be sent in certain states of the world. In this case, we speak of direct 
signals, in that signals directly reveal information about the state of the world. For instance, a 
fruit seller that pretends to sell excellent apples may let consumers taste an apple, thus 
revealing the quality of the apple. In most of our analysis, however, we will assume that the 
set S is the same for each state of the world (every signal can be sent in every state of the 
world), in which case the subscript is dropped. We then have indirect signals, as the signals 
do not directly contain or reveal information about the state of the world (independent of the 
quality of her apples, the fruit seller can pretend that they are very good). For indirect signals, 
we both consider the case where the cardinality |S| is equal to or larger than the number of 
states of nature that occur with positive probability minus one, so that a separating 
equilibrium is possible, and the case where |S| is smaller than the number of states of nature 
minus one (i.e. one signal is only available though there are three states), in which case a fully 
separating equilibrium is not possible. In the latter case, we have imprecise signaling, as the 
signaling system can never be precise about all states of the world. 
R M L T , , 
  3Sending a signal S after having observed state T comes at cost    T S C  to Z, which may 
differ according to T. We talk of costless signaling if  R M L S , ,   ,   T  T:   0  T S C . We 
talk of costly signaling when there is at least one signal S and state T such that   0  T S C . 
Indirect signals may or may not have a commonly understood meaning. We say that players 
have  no common language if there is no commonly-known meaning of the signals. This 
means that meaning can only arise in equilibrium. We say that players have a common 
language if signals have a commonly-known meaning. This means that the set S consists of a 
set of propositions, with commonly-known meanings such as “state T occurs”, or “either state 
T1 occurs or state T2”, etc. When assuming that there is a common language, we immediately 
assume that this common language is rich, in that one is able to state every possible 
proposition about the states of the world in it. It should be stressed that the existence of a 
common language does not mean that the Z uses signals truthfully, or that the receiver H 
trusts these signals to be used truthfully. The fact that signals have common meaning 
therefore does not mean that signals are credible. 
At stage 3, Nature decides whether or not H receives the signal sent by Z. In particular, H 
receives signal S with probability    S S  , and does not receive the signal with probability 
 S 0   , where   0 0  S  ,    1 0   S S S   . We talk of noisy signaling when there is at 
least one signal S such that   0 0  S  , and of noiseless signaling when   0 0 :   S S  . We 
will consider noisy signaling only for the case of indirect signals. 
At stage 4, H decides which action, with typical action labeled A, to take from a set of 
actions A, where A  . To make the model as parsimonious as possible, in part of our 
analysis we assume that doing R is a strictly dominated action to H, so that effectively only 
actions L and M are relevant. 
R M L , , 
At stage 5, for  ;  ;  H Z I ,  R M L A , ,  R M L T , ,  , player I receives payoff    T A UI  
(where for Z, the costs of sending signals should still be subtracted). It is the case that 
  T A 1 A U T A U H H 2 1   for  ,  T 2 1 A A   , so that the receiver prefers that the action with the 
same label as the state of nature is taken, rather than an action with a different label. If it is alo 
the case that    T A UZ 2  T A UZ 1  for  T A  1 ,  2 1 A A  , we have a game with common 
interests. If not, we have a game with a conflict of interest. 
A Nash equilibrium of the signaling game is a pair consisting of a signaling strategy   
and of an action strategy   such that these strategies are mutual best responses. As is 
typically the case for signaling games, our game has multiple Nash equilibria. This can 
already be seen by the fact that it has pooling equilibria. Simply, if H decides to take the same 
action A whether or not a signal is received, then it is best response for Z not to send any 
signals; this in turn makes the given strategy of H a best response. 
) ( * T S
) ( * S A
Given the multiplicity of Nash equilibria, we now define a set of equilibrium refinements 
that have been defined specifically in the context of signaling games. We start with two 
refinements that are rooted in a rational approach, where each time H is assumed to reason 
about Z’s intentions when observing Z deviate from a given equilibrium. We first define 
Farrell’s (1993) neologism proofness, which is only relevant for indirect signals (where the 
signal does not directly reveal anything about the state of the world, as every signal can be 
sent in every state of the world) that have a commonly-known meaning. Whenever we refer to 
neologism-proofness in what follows, this means that we assume a commonly-known 
language. While the issue of the meaning of signals is then resolved, this does not necessarily 
mean that signals are used honestly, i.e. that they are credible. Intuitively, if H unexpectedly 
  4observes an out-of-equilibrium signal, i.e. a “neologism”, if this neologism has a commonly 
known meaning, and if only certain types of senders have an incentive to send it, then H will 
respond to it in a certain manner, which may then induce certain sender types to indeed send 
such a neologism. If this is so, then the considered equilibrium is not neologism-proof. 
 
Definition 1 (Farrell, 1993). Consider an equilibrium E*, and consider an out-of-equilibrium 
signal   taking the form of a proposition P from a commonly-known language. Let Ax be 
H’s best response when P is truthful, and let Z in E* send signal   (which includes the 
possibility of not sending any signal) in state 
' ' S
' S
' T . Denote by   the receiver’s response to 
signal S in equilibrium E*. Then we say that E* is not neologism-proof iff  
) ( * S A
: P T    
      T S C T A U S T S A U S S Z Z   ) 0 ( * 0 ) ( *    > 
        T S C T A U S T A U S S Z x Z ' ' ) 0 ( * ' ' 0 ' ' ' '      . (1) 
 
: ' P T    
          ' ' ' ) 0 ( * ' 0 ' ) ' ( * ' ' T S C T A U S T S A U S S Z Z    




Our next two equilibrium refinements are found in Cho and Kreps (1987), and are only 
relevant for cheap and costly signaling. Whenever we refer to these equilibrium refinements, 
the assumption is that there is no common language. Whereas neologism proofness only deals 
with the credibility of signals, these refinements both deal with meaning and credibility of 
messages. Specifically for costly signaling, it may be the case that for some T that can be 
observed by Z, Z never wants to send a signal S, whatever H’s response to it (including 
whatever response H may have when no signal is observed). It is reasonable then to assume 
that H should never interpret S as having come from T. 
 
 
Definition 2 (Cho and Kreps, 1987). Let 
     T S C T A U S T A U S S w Z v Z A A w v
  0 min
,    > 
         T S C T A U S T A U S S y Z x Z
A A y x
' ' 0 ' ' max
,
    . (3) 
Then we say that for type T, signal   is strictly dominated by signal S.█  ' S
 
From equation (3), it is immediately clear that the strict domination only applies to costly 
signals: with costless signals, the worst payoff that can be obtained by sending signal S can 
never be better than the best payoff obtained by sending signal  .  ' S
The manner in which we can now apply the concept of strictly dominated strategy is by 
repeatedly eliminating them from the game. E.g., we may first note that certain types of 
senders would never want to send a particular signal. We can then first eliminate these signals 
from the senders signal sets, so that analytically we obtain a game that resembles a direct 
signaling game. In this restricted game, we can then further eliminate receiver strategies that 
do not take into account that only certain types of senders can have send certain signals. 
                                                 
1 Note that the response when no signal arrives is always the same as in the equilibrium, as the receiver can then 
not observe that the sender has deviated from the equilibrium. 
  5Rather than checking whether there are certain sender types who would never want to send 
certain signals in any circumstances, we can also look at whether it is not the case that certain 
types would never have an incentive to deviate from a particular equilibrium. This is the idea 
of the intuitive criterion (Cho and Kreps, 1987). The idea is similar to the one of neologism-
proofness, except that it is not required now that out-of-equilibrium signals have commonly-
known meaning, thus the intuitive criterion deals both with meaning and credibility. Suppose 
that players expect to play Nash equilibrium E*. It may now be the case that for some T that 
can be observed by Z, whatever the action taken by H, Z always does worse by sending signal 
' than in E*. Additionally, assume that types other than T exist that do have an incentive to 
deviate from E*. Then H should interpret such a signal   as having come from such types. 
The Nash equilibrium does not meet the intuitive criterion then. We add to Cho and Kreps’ 
original treatment the definition of a separating equilibrium that destabilizes  a pooling 
equilibrium. We then select out separating equilibria that do not destabilize any pooling 
equilibrium. The argument then is that, if the purpose is to explain how communication 
evolves, we must take the pooling equilibrium as a starting point (see Van Rooij (2008) for 
this argument). A separating equilibrium that cannot be achieved from previous or at least 





(i)    (Cho and Kreps, 1987)  Consider a Nash equilibrium E* that includes equilibrium, 
strategies  ,  . Define BR(.) as the set of best responses to a set of types. 
Define as T(S) the set of types in which signal S can be sent. Consider the set τ of all T 
such that  
) ( * T S ) ( * S A
 
      T S C T A U S T S A U S S Z Z   ) 0 ( * 0 ) ( *    > 
          T S C T A U S T A U S S Z x Z S T BR Ax
' ' ) 0 ( * ' ' 0 ' ' ' ' max
) ' ' (  
    , (4) 
 
We then say that signal   is equilibrium dominated for type T. Then a Nash equilibrium 
does not meet the intuitive criterion if there exists a type 
' ' S




          ' ' ' ) 0 ( * ' 0 ' ) ' ( * ' ' T S C T A U S T S A U S S Z Z    
          ' ' ' ' ) 0 ( * ' ' 0 ' ' ' ' ' min
) ( T S C T A U S T A U S S Z y Z BR Ay
 
   
 . (5) 
 
(ii)   We say of equilibrium E** that it destabilizes equilibrium E* if a type-signal pair   
as described under (i) exists for E*, and the strategy consisting of Z’s best response in E*, 
with the type-signal pair   changed into  , is identical to his best response in 
E**. 
) ' , ' ( T S
) ' , ' ( T S ) ' , ' ' ( T S
█ 
 
It is clear from equation (4) that the intuitive criterion can be applied only if signals are direct, 
or if signals are indirect and costly. With direct signals, the cost of revealing is assumed zero, 
but as pointed out under the maximization sign, it may simply be impossible for certain 
signals to have come from certain senders, which the receiver takes into account in his best 
response. With indirect, costly signals, the same effect may be caused by the cost of sending 
certain signals to certain types. 
  6One interpretation of both the Nash equilibrium, and of equilibrium refinements of the Nash 
equilibrium, is that players should not be interpreted as being literally as rational as they are 
modeled to be. The point is that by trial and error, they can learn to behave as if they were 
rational. For this reason, we also introduce an equilibrium selection criterion that is rooted in 
evolutionary game theory, and thus in learning. We do not explicitly model evolutionary 
dynamics and keep our evolutionary criterion unsophisticated, in simply look at whether 
through evolutionary drift (where players may switch to alternative strategies, if these 
strategies are equally best responses; see Binmore and Samuelson, 1999) and some 
evolutionary process such as replicator dynamics or best-response dynamics (where players 
play a strategy more often the better it did in the previous period), there is an evolutionary 
path from Nash equilibrium E* to Nash equilibrium E**, but not back from Nash equilibrium 
E** to Nash equilibrium E*. For instance, in a pooling equilibrium, it is a weak best response 
for receivers to start reacting to an out-of-equilibrium signal in the same manner as in a 
separating equilibrium. Evolutionary drift can then lead them to do this. If a sufficient number 
of receivers change their behavior in this manner, the senders will then next learn to behave as 
in the separating equilibrium. The proportion of receivers that needs to drift in a particular 
direction may be large. Following Sobel (1993), we then simply accept that it may take a very 
long time before the equilibrium is destabilized. This is contrary to e.g., recently Pawlowitsch 
(2008), who does not allow for such drift, and for this reason obtains that sender and receiver 
may get stuck in inefficient equilibria. 
 
 
Definition 4. Consider a Nash equilibrium  * E  with strategy profile  . 
Consider the set 
) ( * ), ( * S A T S
  ) ( * T S BRH
*
 of best responses of H to  . Consider a Nash separating 
equilibrium 
) ( * T S
* E  with strategy profile   ) *(S * * A S ), *(T . Then we say that  * * E  is 
attainable from  * E  if the set of strategies    ) (T BR * S H  contains a strategy   to which 
 is a best response. 
) ( ' S A
) *( * T S
 
We finally note an equilibrium refinement criterion that is hard to formalize, namely that 
certain equilibria may be “focal” (Schelling (1960)). A particular equilibrium may be 
conspicuous to players, it may be common knowledge that it is conspicuous to them, and for 
this reason they may each expect that all other players will play according to it. In the context 
of signaling games, it may be focal to use a certain signal in a particular manner. 
 
 
3. Conflict of interest 
 
In all the models that we treat in this section, Z has a bias towards action L, and thus as such 
wants to pretend that state L occurs even if this is not true. How can Z now still credibly 
signal that it is optimal for R to take action L? In all the models below, Z who observes L 
makes his signal credible by making the sending of this signal prohibitively costly to any 
other type of Z. In the direct-signaling model (3.1), signals directly reveal information, and for 
a sender who did not observe state L it is impossible to reveal information that suggests that 
state L occurs – whereas a sender who does observe state L has no reason to hide information. 
In the costly-signaling model (3.2), the signal literally takes the form of incurring a cost that 
other types would never want to incur. In the noisy-signaling model (3.3), sending signals as 
such may be costless, but Z makes signal L credible by making it noisy in such a way that it 
becomes unattractive to send for other types. In the imprecise model (3.3), again signals may 
be costless, but Z makes signal L less precise, by sending this signal both in states L and M. In 
  7this manner, it becomes too expensive for a Z who observed R to cheat, as the induced action 
is then too remote from Z’s optimal action. In each of the models, H infers the intentions of Z 
by noting that the signal sent could only have been sent by a Z who observed L . While the 




3.1 Direct signaling 
 
In a first type of signaling that we treat, we can abstract both from the problem of the 
meaning of signals, and from their credibility. With direct signals, sending a signal means that 
information that unambiguously determines the state of the world can directly be revealed, or 
that a cue that makes it more likely that a certain state of the world occurs can be revealed. 
The underlying mechanisms can be explained here using only two states M and L. For 
instance, let the sender be a dictator who may (state M) or may not (state L) have weapons of 
mass destruction, and is always better off if the receiver concludes that she does not have such 
weapons (action L). If the dictator can simply reveal whether or not she has weapons, the 
receiver may infer that if she does not reveal anything, she must have weapons (action M). 
This is because the dictator who does not have weapons might as well reveal this, since this 
information is to her advantage (Milgrom, 1981). The principle of pragmatic inference 
applied here is that a sender who does not reveal her information must have something to 
hide. 
In a more subtle version of this model, related to the model of Glazer and Rubinstein 
(2001), because of the costs of providing evidence, the dictator can only either reveal whether 
or not she has nuclear weapons, and whether or not she has chemical weapons, but not both. 
An additional problem here is that the dictator now has an incentive to only reveal 
information that is to her advantage. Thus, when she has nuclear weapons but not chemical 
weapons, she reveals that she does not have chemical weapons, but remains quiet about 
nuclear weapons. Realizing this, the receiver may not find a revelation that one of the types of 
weapons is missing credible. A way around this is that sender and receiver coordinate on an 
equilibrium where information is revealed about only one of the types of weapons. E.g., the 
receiver concludes that the dictator does not have weapons of mass destruction if she reveals 
not to have nuclear weapons, but concludes that she does have weapons if she reveals not to 
have chemical weapons. This is not because revealing that one does not have a certain type of 
weapons is objectively more convincing, but because it stops the dictator from only revealing 
information that is to her advantage. The principle of pragmatic inference applied here is that 
a sender is credible if she reveals a random piece of information, rather than having picked 
one that is to her advantage. We first treat the model where all information can directly be 
revealed, and then the model where only part of the information can be revealed. 
Direct signaling conflict-of-interest model with one cue underlying the states of the 
world. In the simplest version of this model, there are only two states of the world M and L, 
and the sender in state M (L) can either reveal a single cue that unambiguously shows that 
state M (L) occurs, or reveal nothing. When nothing is revealed, the receiver of course cannot 
distinguish whether this was done in state M or state L. As shown in Proposition 1, in terms of 
the weapons example, a pooling equilibrium exists where nothing is revealed. Depending on 
the parameters, the receiver may then either interpret that there are (action M) or are no 
(action L) weapons of mass destruction. At the same time, a separating equilibrium exists 
where the dictator reveals when she has no weapons (state L), and does not reveal otherwise 
(state M). This is a best response for the dictator if the receiver interprets failure to reveal 
  8information as evidence of possession of mass destruction (action M). The dictator who does 
have weapons weakly prefers not to reveal her information. 
 
Proposition 1. Consider the direct-signaling game with two states of the world, where the 
sender can without costs reveal each of the states of the world. Then a Pareto-efficient 
separating equilibrium exists where the sender reveals state L when state L occurs, and where 
state  M is not revealed. If       




L M U L L U






, the pooling equilibrium is also 
Pareto-efficient. If       




L M U L L U






, the pooling equilibrium is not Pareto 
efficient. 
Proof: 
Given that the receiver responds L when L is revealed, and as revelation is costless, the sender 
in state L may as well reveal L. If the sender in state L reveals the state of the world, by not 
revealing the sender in state M is immediately identified by the receiver. 
If       




L M U L L U






, in the pooling equilibrium action L is always taken, which is 
the preferred outcome to each type of sender. As the separating equilibrium makes the sender 
in state M worse off, this pooling equilibrium is Pareto-efficient. 
If       




L M U L L U






, in the pooling equilibrium action M is always taken, so that 
each type of sender becomes weakly better off by moving to the separating equilibrium. 
QED 
 
As a pooling equilibrium always exists, we now check whether equilibrium selection 
arguments select the separating equilibrium. 
 
Proposition 2. Consider the direct-signaling game with one cue underlying the states of the 
world, where the sender can without costs reveal each of the states of the world. 
Let       




L M U L L U







(i)  Pooling equilibria (Pareto inefficient): do not survive iterated elimination of strictly 
dominated strategies and do not meet intuitive criterion, do not destabilize any 
separating equilibria and cannot be attained from them. 
(ii)  Separating equilibria (Pareto efficient): survive iterated elimination of strictly 
dominated strategies, meet intuitive criterion, destabilize pooling equilibria and can be 
attained from them. 
Let       




L M U L L U







(iii)  Pooling equilibria (Pareto efficient): survive iterated elimination of strictly dominated 
strategies, meet intuitive criterion, but do not destabilize any separating equilibria and 
cannot be attained from them. 
(iv)  Separating equilibria (Pareto efficient): survive iterated elimination of strictly 
dominated strategies, meet intuitive criterion; do not destabilize pooling equilibria but 
can be attained from them 
Proof: 
  9(i)  It is strictly dominated for H to interpret a revealed state L as M. By iterated elimination of 
strictly dominated strategies, given this fact, it is a best response for Z to reveal state L. 
Further, the pooling equilibrium does not meet the intuitive criterion because it is 
impossible for type M to reveal a state L, so that any revealed state L can only come from 
type L (equation (5)). It follows that the separating equilibrium destabilizes the pooling 
equilibrium. Finally, it is a best response in the pooling equilibrium for the receiver to do 
L upon out-of-equilibrium revelation of state L. The best response to this strategy by the 
receiving is the strategy of the separating equilibrium, which is therefore attainable from 
the pooling equilibrium. 
(ii) It is strictly dominated for the receiver to respond to a revealed state M with action L. Yet, 
in the separating equilibrium where only type L reveals, type M does not have any 
incentive to reveal her state. It follows that this separating equilibrium survives iterated 
elimination of strictly dominated strategies. For the same reason, this separating 
equilibrium meets the intuitive criterion, so that it is not destabilized by any other 
equilibria. The same applies to separating equilibria where both states are revealed. 
(iii)Even though it is strictly dominated for revealed states not to be met with the right 
response, given the form of the pooling equilibrium neither type has an incentive to reveal 
their types. Applying equation (4), consider  ' ' S  as revealing one’s type. Then type M is 
better off by not revealing, so that set τ contains only state M. However, equation (5) 
cannot be applied because type L only has a weak incentive to reveal. The pooling 
equilibrium therefore meets the intuitive criterion and is not destabilized by any separating 
equilibrium. Finally, in the pooling equilibrium it is a best response for the receiver to 
respond in the appropriate way to revealed signals. Given the resulting receiver strategy, it 
is a weak best response for type L to reveal, and a strict best response for type M not to 
reveal. But this is the equilibrium strategy in a separating equilibrium, which is therefore 
attainable from the pooling equilibrium. 
(iv)  The only difference with (ii) is that separating equilibria do not destabilize pooling 
equilibria, which was shown under (iii). 
QED 
 
Intuitively, if in the pooling equilibrium the receiver concludes that the dictator has 
weapons of mass destruction, then the pooling equilibrium is destabilized by iterated 
elimination of strictly dominated strategies and by the intuitive criterion because the receiver 
knows that the revealed fact that the dictator does not have weapons must be truthful, and 
because the dictator who does not have weapons has an incentive to reveal this fact. However, 
if in the pooling equilibrium the receiver concludes that the dictator does not have weapons of 
mass destruction, then the dictator does not have any incentive to reveal that she does possess 
them, so that the pooling equilibrium is not destabilized.  
Direct signaling conflict-of-interest model with two cues underlying the states of the 
world. We now consider an extension where it continues to be the case that there are only two 
states of the world M (has weapons) and L (does not have weapons), but where there are two 
cues that decide whether state M or state L occurs. This extension bears resemblance to the 
mechanism described by Glazer and Rubinstein (2001), in that only one of the two cues will 
turn out to be convincing in equilibrium. Both the first cue (does or does not have nuclear 
weapons) and the second cue (does or does not have chemical weapons) take on either a value 
of 0 (“no weapons”) or 1 (“weapons”). Each cue is determined independently, where for each 
cue a value of 0 occurs with probability  ) 1 ( x  . It follows that event (0, 0), occurs with 
probability  , events (1, 0) and (0, 1) with probability 
2 ) 1 ( x  ) 1 ( x x  , and event (1, 1) with 
probability x
2. In event (0, 0), response L is optimal (interpret the dictator as not having 
  10weapons), so that we can say that state L occurs with probability  . In events (1, 
1), (1, 0), (0, 1) the best response is M (interpret the dictator as having weapons), so that in 
this event, state M occurs, where  . 
2 ) 1 ( x L   
2 ) 1 ( 2 x x x M    
If the sender is able to reveal both cues, then we have a similar model as before. The 
receiver then interprets any non-revealed cue as having a value of 1. The reasoning is that a 
receiver who observes a 0 may as well reveal it. Here, we assume instead that the sender is 
only able to reveal a single cue. Given that the sender prefers that action L is always taken, a 
strategy of the sender could be to always reveal a cue 0 if at least one cue 0 occurs, so that the 
sender always reveals information that is to her advantage. Under the assumptions of 
Proposition 3, however, it is a best response then for the receiver to always do M (interpret as 
having weapons) in this case. Under these same assumptions, a separating equilibrium still 
exists where the sender only reveals one of the cues, say the first one, when it has a value of 
one, and never reveals the second cue. 
Intuitively, if the sender is only able to reveal one cue at a time, then in order for the sender 
to make it credible that she is not only revealing information on the cue that is to her 
advantage, she should reveal only a particular cue. In terms of the dictator example, e.g., the 
dictator should only reveal whether or not she has nuclear weapons. 
 
 
Proposition 3. In the direct-signaling model with two cues underlying the state of the world, 
let       
    x
x
L
M ) 1 ( 

M U L L U











. Then in the Pareto-inefficient pooling 
equilibrium, M is always done. In the Pareto-efficient separating equilibrium, the sender only 




Let the sender reveal a zero whenever he observes at least one zero. Then the receiver prefers 
to do M given that 
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It follows that there is no separating equilibrium where the sender reveals a 0 when it is to her 
advantage. 
The sender can instead employ a strategy where she only reveals whether the value of a 
particular cue out of the two cues is 0, and never reveals anything about the other cue. If the 
receiver observes a 0 revealed for the particular cue, it is a best response for her to do L iff 
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When nothing is revealed, it is a best response for the receiver to do M, as given the sender’s 
equilibrium strategy, this automatically means that the particular cue takes on a value of 1. 
Further, given that the sender does not reveal anything about the other cue, it is a weak best 
response for the receiver to do L whenever the other cue is revealed (independently of 
whether a 0 or a 1 is revealed). 
In turn, given that the receiver follows such a strategy, it is a weak best response for the 
sender not to reveal anything about the other cue, and to reveal nothing when the particular 
cue has value 1. However, given that the sender has a preference for response L being taken, 
she reveals when the particular cue has a value of zero. 
In the pooling equilibrium, response M is adopted as       
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. This is because we have assumed that       
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and because  2
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. The pooling equilibrium is Pareto-inefficient as each 




Proposition 4 again checks whether pooling equilibria are eliminated by equilibrium 
selection arguments. 
 
Proposition 4. Consider the direct-signaling game with two cues underlying the states of the 
world, let       
   ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 2 x
x
L M U L L U












(i)  The  pooling equilibrium survives iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies, 
meets the intuitive criterion, does not destabilize the separating equilibrium, and cannot be 
attained from the separating equilibrium. 
(ii) The separating equilibrium survives iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies, 
and meets the intuitive criterion. It does not destabilize the pooling equilibrium, but can be 
attained from it. 
Proof: 
Consider a pooling equilibrium, and let the receiver unexpectedly observe a revealed “0”. 
Then it is not the case that only a sender who observed (0, 0) could benefit from deviating 
from the pooling equilibrium. Thus, the pooling equilibrium meets the intuitive criterion, and 
the separating equilibrium does not destabilize it. 
The separating equilibrium meets the intuitive criterion for the following reason. Suppose 
that in equilibrium only the first cue is revealed, but the receiver still unexpectedly observes a 
revealed “0” from the second cue. Then it is not the case that only a sender who observed (0, 
0) could benefit from deviating from the separating equilibrium. Yet, the separating 
equilibrium can be attained from the pooling equilibrium because the receiver could become 
predisposed to considering only one of the two possible revealed 0’s as conclusive. 
QED 
 
In the model with two cues (possession of nuclear weapons, and of chemical weapons), in 
terms of the dictator example, in the pooling equilibrium the receiver concludes that the 
dictator has weapons of mass destruction. Even though only a single cue can be revealed, a 
  12separating equilibrium still exists if only evidence on the non-possession of a single type of 
weapons is considered relevant. Yet, the problem is that if in the pooling equilibrium the 
receiver unexpectedly observes the sender to reveal that she does not have a certain type of 
weapons, there is no way of telling that she still did not pick only the information that is to her 
advantage, and that she still possesses weapons of the other type. Thus, from this perspective 
the mechanism that only one piece of evidence is considered relevant does not seem to work. 
Still, if in the pooling equilibrium through drift the receiver becomes predisposed to consider 
only evidence on e.g. nuclear weapons as conclusive, then the separating equilibrium can still 
evolve from the pooling equilibrium. 
The principle of considering only one piece of evidence relevant also works if one piece of 
evidence is somehow considered as focal. Rubinstein and Glazer (2001) offer the following 
motivating example: 
 
“You are participating in a public debate about the level of education in the world’s capitals. 
You are trying to convince the audience that in most capital cities, the level of education has 
risen recently. Someone is challenging you, bringing up indisputable evidence showing that 
the level of education in Bangkok has deteriorated. Now it is your turn to respond. You have 
similar, indisputable evidence to show that the level of education in Mexico City, Manila, 
Cairo and Brussels has gone up. However, because of time constraints, you can argue and 
present evidence only about one of the four cities mentioned above. Which city would you 
choose for making the strongest counterargument against Bangkok?” 
 
The authors conducted an experiment on this, showing that most of the time the 
counterargument is Manila. The point here is that by the fact that Manila is closest to 
Bangkok, the sender signals that she is choosing a particular cue, and not necessarily the cue 
that is most to her advantage. Thus, there is some focal feature of one of the cues that makes it 
seem that a particular cue was chosen, and not one necessarily to the advantage of the sender.
2 
Such an argument cannot be caught by iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies, or 
by the intuitive criterion. 
 
 
3.2 Costly signaling 
 
In the next model, signals do not directly reveal the sender’s information, so that credibility 
is an issue. Meaning may or may not be an issue, in that signals may or may not be grounded 
in a common language. The sender always would like to get the same response. The manner 
in which signals are still made credible is that signals are costly, and that the cost incurred 
from sending a signal differs according to one’s type. The principle of pragmatic inference 
applied here is that a particular signal could never have been sent by certain sender types, as 
sending such a signal is too costly to them. For instance, suppose that a sender always wants 
to be considered as being rich. Then lighting a cigar with a $100 bill is a credible signal that 
one is rich, as a poor person finds it too costly to do this. Lighting a $100 bill may or may not 
already have a commonly known meaning of signaling richness. The point here is that this 
signal is credible. This model has independently been developed in economics (educational 
signaling on the labor market, Spence, 1973) and in biology (handicap signaling, Zahavi, 
1974). 
                                                 
2 It is easy to generalize the model we present to make it closer to Rubinstein and Glazer. In such a model, there 
are more than two cues determine the state of the world, and the sender can only communicate two cues. The 
sender can could convince the receiver that she is not only reporting two cues that are to her advantage if these 
two cues have focal features, such as lying close to each other. 
  13Costly signaling conflict-of-interest model. In the simplest version of this model, there are 
only two states M and L. A set of signals is available to the sender, which are differentiated 
according to their costs. However, a costly signal can still credibly signal that state L occurs. 
 
Proposition 5. Consider the conflict-of-interest costly signaling game. Then a separating 
Nash equilibrium where the sender sends signal S in state L, and no signal in state M, exists iff 
   M M U M L U M S C Z Z     and   
 
 
  L M U L L U
L S C
M M U M L U
M S C




separating equilibrium with the signal S from set S which has the lowest   L S C   such that the 
conditions are valid, is the only separating equilibrium that is Pareto-efficient. If 
     
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, the pooling equilibrium is also Pareto-efficient. If 
     




L M U L L U






, the pooling equilibrium is not Pareto efficient. 
Proof: 
If Z plays the strategy of the specified candidate separating equilibrium, it is a best response 
for H to do L when receiving signal S, and to do M otherwise. If H plays the strategy of the 
specified candidate separating equilibrium, it is a best response for Z to send signal S in state 
L and not to send any signal in state M iff     M S C M L U M M U Z Z     and 
    L M U L S C L L U Z Z   . The conditions follow. QED 
 
The condition      M M U M L U M S C Z Z    means that it must be costly for Z to send 
signal S, meaning that costly signaling is a necessary condition for a separating equilibrium in 
the specified game. It should be noted that the signal need not be costly to type L, meaning 
that in equilibrium a cost of signaling need not ever be incurred (Hurd, 1995). In the most 
well-known version of the second condition for the existence of a separating equilibrium, 
       L M U L L U M M U M L U Z Z Z Z     , so that the condition reduces to 
 L S C M S C   . This means that the signal must be differentially costly; put otherwise, it 
must be more costly to send signal S in state M than in state L (Grafen, 1990). Yet, less well-
known is that signals need not be differentially costly. If      L S C M S C  , so that signal S is 
equally costly to all types, then a separating equilibrium can still exist if 
       L M U L L U M M U M L U Z Z Z Z     . This is the differential benefits version of 
Spence-Zahavi model (Johnstone, 1997). Intuitively, either there is a signal that is too costly 
to send in state M; or signal cost is the same in all states, but the sender in state L is more 
motivated to send a costly signal. 
In the set of separating equilibria, clearly the Pareto efficient equilibrium is the one where 
the signaling cost incurred by the sender is as low as possible. But this need not be the only 
Pareto-efficient equilibrium. This is because, as pointed out by Spence, a separating 
equilibrium does not always make Z better off. In particular, if the game has a pooling 
equilibrium where L is always done, Z is worse off in the separating equilibrium, where his 
preferred action L does not always get done, and where additionally a costly signal may have 
to be sent. It follows that both the efficient separating equilibrium and the pooling equilibrium 
are Pareto efficient in the case. If in the pooling equilibrium M is always done, then only 
efficient separating equilibrium is Pareto-efficient. We next check which of the multiple 
equilibria survive equilibrium refinements. 
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Proposition 6. Consider the conflict-of-interest costly signaling game. 
Let       
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(i)  The  pooling equilibria (Pareto inefficient) are not neologism proof against separating 
equilibria, do not survive iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies, do not meet 
the intuitive criterion, do not destabilize any separating equilibria and cannot be attained 
from them. 
(ii) The inefficient separating equilibria are not neologism proof against efficient separating 
equilibria, do not survive iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies, do not meet 
the intuitive criterion, destabilize pooling equilibria but not efficient separating equilibria, 
can be attained from pooling equilibria but not from efficient separating equilibria. 
(iii)The efficient separating equilibria is neologism proof, survives iterated elimination of 
strictly dominated strategies, meets the intuitive criterion, destabilizes inefficient 
separating equilibria and pooling equilibria, and can be attained from them. 
Let       




L M U L L U







(iv)  The pooling equilibria (Pareto efficient) are neologism proof, survive iterated elimination 
of strictly dominated strategies, meet the intuitive criterion, but do not destabilize any 
separating equilibria and cannot be attained from them. 
(v) The inefficient separating equilibria are not neologism proof against efficient equilibria, 
do not survive iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies, do not meet intuitive 
criterion, do not destabilize efficient separating equilibria or pooling equilibria, and cannot 
be attained from them. 
(vi)  The efficient separating equilibria is neologism proof, survives iterated elimination of 
strictly dominated strategies, meets the intuitive criterion, destabilizes inefficient 
separating equilibria but not pooling equilibria, and can be attained from inefficient 
separating equilibria but not from pooling equilibria. 
Proof: 
(i)  If the costly signal already has a common meaning “do L”, if the receiver follows it, type 
M does not want to send it by        M S C M L U M M U Z Z    (equation (1)), but L does 
by     L M Z  (equation (2)), so that the pooling equilibrium is not 
neologism proof. By 
U L S C L L UZ  
    M S C M L U M M U Z Z    it is strictly dominated for Z to send 
a signal in state M, even if the receiver responds with L. The strategy where a signal is 
sent in state M can thus be eliminated, so that the receiver interprets any signal without a 
common meaning as referring to state L. Given       M S C U  it is 
further equilibrium dominated for type M to send a signal (equation (4)). It follows by 
equation (5) that the pooling equilibrium does not meet the intuitive criterion, and is 
destabilized by the efficient separating equilibrium. 
M L U M M Z Z  
(ii) By the same reasoning as under (i), a cheaper costly signal for which the assumptions are 
still valid makes an inefficient separating equilibrium not neologism proof. For all such 
signals, it is strictly dominated to send them in state M, and equilibrium dominated with 
respect to the inefficient separating equilibrium to send them in state M. It follows that an 
inefficient separating equilibrium is eliminated by iterated elimination of strictly 
dominated strategies, does not meet the intuitive criterion, and is destabilized by the 
efficient separating equilibrium. 
  15(iii)The efficient separating equilibrium is neologism proof and meets the intuitive criterion 
because the sender in state M does not have any incentive to send a signal, and because 
the sender in state L does not have any incentive to send a more expensive signal. Thus, 
the efficient separating is not destabilized by any other equilibria. Other equilibria are not 
attainable from it, because even if the receiver also responds to more expensive signals, 
the sender will not send them. 
(iv)  The pooling equilibrium is neologism proof because both types M and L are already 
receiving their preferred response at no cost, and have no incentive to send a costly signal. 
Even though it is strictly dominated for type M to send a signal so that by iterated 
elimination of strictly dominated strategies the response to a signal is always L, given the 
form of the pooling equilibrium type L does not have any incentive to send a signal. The 
pooling equilibrium meets the intuitive criterion because applying equation (4) the set τ 
contains both states of the world, so that equation (5) cannot be applied. The pooling 
equilibrium is therefore not destabilized by any separating equilibrium. Finally, even if in 
the pooling equilibrium it is a best response for the receiver to interpret an out-of-
equilibrium signal as coming from type L, it is not a best response for the sender to send 
the signal, so that no separating equilibrium is attainable from the pooling equilibrium. 
(v) The only difference with (ii) is that inefficient separating equilibria do not destabilize 
pooling equilibria and cannot be attained from them, which was shown under (iv). 
(vi)  The only difference with (iii) is that inefficient separating equilibria do not destabilize 
pooling equilibria and cannot be attained from them, which was shown under (iv). 
QED 
 
Concluding, Proposition 6 tells us the following in terms of the $100 bill example. As only 
a rich person has an incentive to burn $100, a receiver will always interpret such a signal to 
have come from a rich person. This is independent of whether or not burning $100 already 
refers to richness in a commonly known signaling system. For the same reason, in equilibrium 
the sender will not burn more money than is necessary to prove that she is rich. Nevertheless, 
if the pooling equilibrium is such that the receiver without information interprets the sender to 
be rich (e.g., because there are few poor people), then while a separating equilibrium exists, it 
will not be played if players initially play the pooling equilibrium. The sender is already 
interpreted to be rich without wasting $100, and therefore does not send the signal. 
 
 
3.3 Noisy signaling 
 
Using a story adapted from Blume, Board and Kawamura (2007) (see De Jaegher and Van 
Rooij, 2011), Romeo wants to know from Juliet whether or not she loves him. Romeo can 
either conclude that Juliet loves him, conclude that she does not love him, or make no 
conclusion. Whether or not she loves Romeo, Juliet most prefers that Romeo concludes that 
she loves him, and least prefers that he does not make any conclusion, with Romeo’s 
conclusion that he does not love her in between. Because of Juliet’s preferences, her signal “I 
love you”, expressed in a commonly known language, is not credible to Romeo. Still, as 
argued, Juliet’s signal “I love you” can be made credible if it is ambiguous. In particular, if 
her signal “I love you” is sometimes misinterpreted by Romeo to be inconclusive, and is 
misinterpreted in this manner more often than her “I don’t love you” signal, then Juliet may 
still prefer to be honest. Juliet may achieve this by sending the “I love you” signal in several 
contexts, where Romeo imperfectly observes these contexts. She may e.g., send this signal 
both in the context where she loves Romeo, and in the context where she does not love him, 
but just had an excellent time. Romeo gets an imperfect cue of whether Juliet had an excellent 
  16time, and makes no conclusion about her feelings if she says “I love you” and he gets a cue 
that she had an excellent time. In this way, Juliet’s signal “I love you” sometimes leads to 
Juliet’s least preferred response. The principle of pragmatic inference applied here by Romeo 
is that only a Juliet who really loves him would be willing to make her signal so ambiguous. 
Conflict-of-interest noisy signaling model (De Jaegher, 2003a, 2003b). In order to 
construct a simple model reflecting this intuition, let there be two states of the world L and M, 
and three responses L, M and R (related models where a conflict of interest is solved by means 
of noisy signals can be found in Myerson, 1991; Farrell, 1993; Blume, Board and Kawamura, 
2007; Blume and Board, 2009). In each state of the world, the receiver prefers the right 
response, but prefers response R when getting too little information. The sender in each state 
prefers response L to response M to response R. The sender can choose from a set of costless, 
noisy signals which each get lost with different probabilities. Denote by   S 0    the 
probability that a signal gets lost, and by    S S   the probability that it arrives. The receiver is 
assumed to know what level of noise is attached to a received signal S. 
 
Proposition 7. Consider the conflict-of-interest noisy signaling model. Let 
  M R U M M U Z Z  *      L R U L L U Z Z    ≥        L R U L M U Z Z   *     M R U M L U Z Z   
and let     L M U L R U H H  *       M L U M R U H H    ≥     L R U L L U H H  * 
  M R U M M U H H    . Then a separating Nash equilibrium where Z sends signal S1 in state 
L and signal S2 in state M and where the receiver does R when not receiving a signal, exists 
only if   0 0 0 2 1   S S   . A unique Pareto-efficient equilibrium exists with a minimal 
level of noise on both signals. Finally, in the pooling equilibrium, the receiver does R. 
Proof: 
When not receiving any signal, H should prefer to do R to L: 
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where the right-hand side in (7) is smaller than 1. It follows from (7) that it needs to be the 
case that   0 0 2  S  . Also, when not receiving any signal, H should prefer to do R to M: 
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where the left-hand side in (9) is larger than 1. By (6) and (8), it should be the case that 
   L M U L R U H H    > 0 and     M L U M R U H H    > 0. Combined with (7) and (9), it 
follows that a necessary condition for the existence of a separating equilibrium is that 
   L M U L R U H H  *      M L U M R U H H   ≥        L R U L L U H H  *    M R U M M U H H  . 
At the same time, the sender should prefer to send the right signal in each state, and prefer 
this to not sending any signal at all. That is, for Z who observes state L, we must have: 
 
           L R U S L M U S S L R U S L L U S S Z Z Z Z 2 2 2 1 1 1 0 0         (10) 
and 
     L R U L R U S L L U S S Z Z Z   1 1 1 0    (11) 
 
For Z who observes state M, we must have: 
 
            M R U S M L U S S M R U S M M U S S Z Z Z Z 1 1 1 2 2 2 0 0         (12) 
and 
       M R U M R U S M M U S S Z Z Z   2 2 2 0    (13) 
 
By the fact that    L R U L M U Z Z  ,      M R U M L U Z Z  , constraints (11) and (13) are slack. 
Constraints (10) and (12) can respectively be rewritten as: 
 
             
1 1
2 1 0 1 0 1
 








0 1 0 1
 
     S S M R U M L U M R U M M U Z Z Z Z    (15) 
 
In (14), the right-hand side is smaller than 1; in (15), the left-hand side is also smaller than 1. 
From the latter, it follows that in any separating equilibrium, it must be the case that 
 2 1 0 0 S S     . Further, it follows from (14) and (15) that a separating equilibrium can only 
exist if    M R U M M U Z Z  *       L R U L L U Z Z    ≥      L R U L M U Z Z   
*    M R U M L U Z Z    . It follows that under the conditions specified in the proposition, levels 
of   1 0S    and   2 0S    exist such that constraints (7), (9), (14) and (15) are valid, so that a 
separating equilibrium exists. 
The fact that there is a unique Pareto-efficient separating equilibrium with minimal noise 
can be seen by plotting (7), (9), (14) and (15) in graph with    1 0S   on one axis and    2 0S   
on the other. The fact that R is done in the pooling equilibrium follows from (7) or (9) 
combined with the result that    2 1 0 0 S S    . 
  18QED 
 
We next look at whether equilibrium refinement arguments select a separating equilibrium, 
and in particular a Pareto-efficient one. We do not consider iterated elimination of strictly 
dominated strategies. As there are no direct costs of sending the signals, it is not true that 
certain types would never want to send them. By the same reasoning, it is not true that only 
certain types can get better than in a given equilibrium be sending them, so that the intuitive 
criterion is also not considered here. 
 
Proposition 8. Consider the conflict-of-interest noisy signaling model. 
(i)  The pooling equilibria are neologism proof and cannot be attained from any separating 
equilibria. 
(ii)  The inefficient separating equilibria are not neologism proof against efficient separating 
equilibria, and can be attained from pooling equilibria but not from efficient separating 
equilibria. 
(iii)  The efficient separating equilibrium is neologism proof and can be attained from both 
inefficient separating equilibria and pooling equilibria. 
Proof: 
(i)  A receiver who expects the pooling equilibrium to be played and unexpectedly observes 
a noisy signal S1 or a noisy signal S2 cannot make any inference that these signals must 
have been sent by a certain type of sender. Only if both signals are used at the same time 
may they be credible, and the receiver has no indication that the sender is using both 
signals at the same time. Still, in a pooling equilibrium, it is a best response for the 
receiver to respond by L (M) to a noisy S1 (S2) signal, so that the sender’s strategy from 
a separating equilibrium becomes a best response. It follows that any separating 
equilibria are attainable from the pooling equilibrium. 
We next look at the attainability of a pooling equilibrium from a separating equilibrium. 
While in a separating equilibrium R is already played when not receiving any signal, it is 
not a best response for the sender to deviate and stop sending signals. It follows that 
pooling equilibria are not attainable from separating equilibria. 
(ii)  By plotting (7), (9), (14) and (15) in graph with    1 0S   on one axis and   2 0S   on the 
other, it can be seen that starting from a Pareto-inefficient separating equilibrium, a 
Pareto superior separating equilibrium exists where one of the signals is made less 
noisy. Thus, if starting from an inefficient separating equilibrium, a slightly less noisy 
signal with a commonly known meaning is observed, then by (1) it cannot have been 
used untruthfully. Given that it is less noisy, by (2) it will be sent. 
In a Pareto-efficient separating equilibrium, it is a best response to the receiver to also 
find more noisy out-of-equilibrium signals credible, but this does not make it a best 
response for the sender to send them instead. Thus, Pareto-inefficient separating 
equilibria are not attainable from efficient ones. 
(iii)  In the efficient separating equilibrium, while by (1) only a truthful sender may have an 
incentive to send a more noisy signal so that a more noisy signal is trusted, this does not 
give the sender any incentive to send a more noisy signal. Further, in the Pareto-
inefficient equilibrium, it is a best response for the receiver to find the signals from the 
efficient separating equilibrium credible, and this makes it a best response for the sender 
to send them. Thus, the Pareto-efficient separating equilibrium is attainable from 
inefficient separating equilibria. 
QED 
 
  19In terms of the Romeo-Juliet example, the point of Proposition 8 is that a single noisy signal 
does not make Juliet’s signals credible. Even if her “I love you” signal is sometimes 
misinterpreted, if the starting point is the pooling equilibrium, not only a Juliet who loves, but 
one who does not love Romeo has an incentive to send such a signal. Only if Juliet can choose 
between a noisy “I love you” signal and a noisy “I don’t love you” signal does it become 
credible that she is honest. Thus, a single new signal observed cannot convince of Juliet’s 
honesty. Romeo must know that Juliet is using a system of noisy signals. Still, in a pooling 
equilibrium, evolutionary drift could predispose Rome to respond to two noisy signals in an 
appropriate way, after which Juliet would find it a best response to send them. 
 
 
3.4 Imprecise signaling 
 
Under the pressure of the local tourist industry, a weather forecaster would like to 
systematically predicts higher temperatures than will truly happen at the seaside – unless the 
temperature will be perfect anyway. When the temperature will be 20
oC, the weather 
forecaster would like the public to believe the temperature is 22
oC, when it will 22
oC he 
would like them to believe it will be 24
oC, and when it will be 24
oC he would like them to 
believe it is indeed 24
oC. How can the forecaster’s prediction still be credible? The forecaster 
can achieve credibility by being imprecise. Given that she does not want the public’s 
expectations to deviate too widely from the truth, if she makes her signals imprecise, she 
gives herself an incentive to send these signals in a truthful way. In this case, she could 
predict that it will be 20
oC if this is indeed true, and predict that it will be 22
oC or more in all 
other cases, where the latter leads to an expectation by the public that it will be 24
oC. Given 
this response by the public to her imprecise signal, the forecaster does not want to predict that 
it will be at least 22
oC when it will be only 20
oC. In general, the principle of pragmatic 
inference applied here is that the sender is so imprecise that the incentive to cheat is no longer 
present. 
Conflict-of-interest imprecise signaling model. The model reflecting this story is a 
simplified version of Crawford and Sobel (1981). There are three states of the world L, M and 
R, and three responses with the same label. In every state, the receiver prefers to take the 
action with the same label. When only knowing that state R does not occur, the receiver 
prefers response L. In state R, the sender’s most preferred response is M, but she still prefers 
that the receiver adopts response R rather than L. In both states M and L, she prefers him to 
take action L. As shown in Proposition 9, the conflict of interest is resolved if the sender sends 
the same signal in states M and L. This is the only separating equilibrium. 
 
Proposition 9. Consider the conflict-of-interest imprecise signaling model. Assume that 
   R L U R R U R M U Z Z Z   ,     ZZ UL S UM S  ,      ZZ UL S UR S   for  . 
Let 
, SL M 
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, meaning that a receiver who knows that state R does not 
occur prefers to take action L. Then in the only separating Nash equilibrium, the sender does 
the same in state M and L (send a signal or not send a signal). 
Proof: 
There is no equilibrium where Z honestly reveals all states, since otherwise Z in state R would 
send a message inducing action M, and Z in state M would send a message inducing action L. 
  20There is no equilibrium where Z pools states M and R. This is because Z in state M would then 
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, when Z pools M and L, H does 
L. It follows that Z in state L and M do not want to send the signal inducing R. At the same 
type, Z in R does not want to send the pooled signal, as Z in R prefers action R to action L. 
QED 
 
Checking whether the unique separating equilibrium is selected against equilibrium 
refinement arguments, we need not look at iterated elimination of strictly dominated 
strategies, or at the intuitive criterion. This is because signals are assumed cheap here, so that 
the receiver cannot conclude that they could only have been sent by certain types. 
 
 
Proposition 10. Consider the conflict-of-interest imprecise signaling model. 
(i)  The  pooling equilibria are not neologism proof and cannot be attained from any 
separating equilibrium. 
(ii) The  separating equilibrium is neologism proof, and can be attained from pooling 
equilibria. 
Proof: 
(i)  Pooling equilibria are not neologism proof, whatever the form they take. If R is the 
receiver’s best response in the pooling equilibrium, consider a neologism “R does not 
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this cannot have been sent by the type R sender. By     M L U M R U Z Z  , 
  L L UZ , the type M and type L sender has an incentive to send such a signal. 
If L is the best response in the pooling equilibrium, consider a neologism of the form 
“state R occurs”. By 
L R UZ 
   M L U M R U Z Z  ,      L L U L R U Z Z  , and     R L U R R U H H  , 
equation (1) tells that type L and M senders do not have an incentive to send such a 
signal. By    R L U U Z , equation (2) tells that the type R sender does have an 
incentive to send such a message. If M is the best response in the pooling equilibrium, 
consider a neologism of the form “state M or L occurs”. By 
R R Z 
   R L U U Z  and  R M Z 
     
  L H H
H H
M L U M M U





 , the type R sender does not have any incentive to send a 
message inviting response L rather than response M. By    M L U M M U Z Z  , 
  L L UZ , the type M and L senders do prefer to send such a signal.  L M UZ 
Starting from the separating equilibrium, whatever the response of the receiver when no 
signal is received, it is not in the sender´s interest to stop sending signals. 
(ii)  Starting from the separating equilibrium, a neologism “do M”. could only have been sent 
by the player in state R, so that the receiver will still respond with R to such a signal. If in 
the separating equilibrium, the sender sends a signal “do L or M”, a neologism “do 
L”.could not have been sent by type R, so that the receiver will do L when receiving it. 
But this does not give M or L any incentive to send this signal, as they already obtain L. –
By the previous arguments, a neologism do “do L or R” does not destabilize the 
separating equilibrium, whatever the receiver´s response to it. 
  21In the pooling equilibrium, it is a best response for the receiver to respond with L to an 
out-of-equilibrium signal, making it a best response for the sender to employ his best 
response in the separating equilibrium. 
QED 
 
Intuitively, as there is only a single separating equilibrium, it is not a problem to reach this 
from the pooling equilibrium, both by means of attainability and by means of neologisms. 
 
 
4. Games with common interests 
 
In the conflict-of interest models of Section 3, the driving principle is that Z is biased 
towards always reporting the same state of the world. If this state of the world actually occurs, 
the only manner in which Z can still convince H of this is by making his signal costly in such 
a manner that another type of Z would never want to put up with. H infers from the costly 
signal that this must have come from one type of Z. This can happen by revealing information 
that only a sender in this state could reveal, by making one’s signal costly to send in terms of 
the direct cost of sending it, or indirectly in terms of its noisiness or imprecision. 
In the current section, we treat common-interest models. For costly signaling, noisy 
signaling and imprecise signals, the intuition is each time that it is efficient for sender and 
receiver to incur any unavoidable costs of signaling only in states where this cost has the least 
impact. Thus, a costly signal should only be sent in infrequent states, so that the cost is 
incurred as little as possible. Similarly, the cost of noisiness or imprecision should be left for 
states where this has less impact, again because these states are infrequent or because 
mistakes are less costly in these states. In our common-interest direct signaling model, the 
intuition is different. There, it is efficient to trust that revelations by the sender that are as such 
inconclusive (e.g., a single piece of good news) still tell something about the overall state of 
the world (e.g., overall good news). 
 
 
4.1 Direct signaling 
 
Returning to the dictator example of Section 3.1, we now assume that the dictator and the 
inspector have common interests. Thus, if she were able to do so, the dictator would reveal to 
the inspector her status with respect to both chemical and nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, 
due to costs she is only able to reveal either evidence on whether or not she has nuclear 
weapons, or evidence on whether or not she has chemical weapons. Objectively, if e.g., she 
reveals that she does not have nuclear weapons, this is unconvincing to the receiver. Yet, 
sender and receiver can coordinate on an equilibrium where the dictator reveals whatever type 
of weapons she has if she has only one type of them, reveals any type if she has both of them, 
and reveals herself not to have one of the types if she has neither of them. While objectively 
speaking evidence that one of the types is not in her possession does not prove that she has no 
weapons at all, given that the dictator has good intentions, the receiver still infers that there 
are no weapons. The principle of pragmatic inference applied here is that as the signaler has 
the same interests, an as such inconclusive piece of bad news is interpreted as overall bad 
news, and an as such inconclusive piece of good news is interpreted as overall good news. 
Direct signaling common-interests model with two cues underlying the states of the 
world. The model is identical to the two-cue model in Section 3.1, except that sender and 
receiver have common interests. The sender still is only able to reveal a single cue. A 
separating equilibrium now exists where the sender only reveals one of the cues to be “0” (no 
  22nuclear weapons, or no chemical weapons) if in fact both cues are “0”, and does not reveal 
anything otherwise. This is in spite of the fact that literally speaking, a single “0” revealed 
does not give the receiver sufficient direct information that state L occurs (“the dictator does 
not have weapons of mass destruction”). In terms of the dictator example, the dictator’s 
evidence that he does not have one type of weapons is interpreted as evidence that he has 
neither type of weapons. Further, a pooling equilibrium exists, where the form of the 
receiver’s response depends on the parameters. 
 
 
Proposition 11. Consider the direct signaling common-interests model with two cues 
underlying the states of the world. 
(i)  If       
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, in the pooling equilibrium action M is always taken. 
If       





L M U L L U








, in the pooling equilibrium action L is always taken. 
(ii) A separating equilibrium exists where the sender reveals a “0” if both of the cues have a 
value of 0, and does not reveal anything otherwise. A separating equilibrium also exists 
where the sender reveals a “1” if at least one of the cues has a value of 1, and nothing 
otherwise. Finally, a separating equilibrium exists where the sender reveals a “0” only if 
both cues have value of zero, and reveals a “1” if at least one of two values is 1. 
Proof: 
For the proof of (i), see the proof of Proposition 3. (ii): if the receiver believes that a single 
revealed “0” means that both cues have a value of 0, then given common interests the sender 
follows the candidate equilibrium strategy. This in turn makes it a best response for the 




The results in Proposition 11 show a fundamental difference with the conflict-of-interest 
model. With a conflict of interest, in a separating equilibrium, the sender reports only the 
value of a specific cue and never the information on the other cue in order to avoid giving the 
impression that she only reports information that is to her advantage. With common interests, 
the sender reports the value of any cue that happens to be representative for the overall state 
of the world. We now investigate whether equilibrium selection eliminates the pooling 
equilibrium in favor of such a separating equilibrium in the case of common interests. 
 
Proposition 12. Consider the direct signaling common-interests model with two cues 
underlying the states of the world. 
(i)  If       
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, the pooling equilibrium survives iterated 
elimination of strictly dominated strategies, meets the intuitive criterion, but cannot be 
attained from any separating equilibrium. Every separating equilibrium survives the 
intuitive criterion and is attainable from the pooling equilibrium, but does not destabilize 
the pooling equilibrium. 
(ii) If       
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, the pooling equilibrium does not survive iterated 
elimination of strictly dominated strategies, does not meet the intuitive criterion, and 
cannot be attained from any separating equilibrium. Every separating equilibrium survives 
  23the intuitive criterion and is attainable from the pooling equilibrium, but only the 
separating equilibrium where the sender reveals a “0” if at least one of the cues is a zero, 
and does not reveal anything otherwise, destabilizes the pooling equilibrium. 
Proof: 
In general, any separating equilibrium is attainable from any pooling equilibrium, as in a 
pooling equilibrium it is always a best response to respond in the proper way to an out-of-
equilibrium revealed cue. 
(i)  It is strictly dominated for a receiver to whom a “1” is revealed to do anything but M. But 
this does not lead to elimination of the pooling equilibrium by iterated elimination of 
strictly dominated strategies, as the receiver already does M in the pooling equilibrium. A 
sender who observes at least one 1 and reveals a “0” or a “1” is not strictly better off in 
equilibrium than with the best he can achieve by not revealing a “0” or a “1” (namely 
equally well obtain response M). A sender who observes two values of 0 is better off by 
revealing a “0” if this leads the receiver to do L. It follows that there is no type for which 
revelation of a cue is equilibrium dominated, so that the pooling equilibrium meets the 
intuitive criterion. 
(ii) It is strictly dominated for a receiver to whom a “1” is revealed to do anything but M. 
Given that L is always done in the pooling equilibrium, the sender deviates and reveals a 
“1” if at least one of his cues has a value of 1. Thus, the pooling equilibrium is eliminated 
by iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies in favor of the separating 
equilibrium. Further, it is impossible for the sender who does not observe 1s to reveal a 1. 
It follows that by equation (5), the sender who observes at least a 1 is better off by 
revealing a “1”, so that the pooling equilibrium does not meet the intuitive criterion. 
QED 
 
As shown by Proposition 12, in terms of the dictator example, if in the pooling equilibrium 
the receiver concludes that the dictator does not have weapons of mass destruction, then this 
equilibrium is not stable because the receiver knows that a cue that the dictator does have 
such weapons can only be sent by a dictator who indeed has them. If in the pooling 
equilibrium the receiver instead concludes that the dictator does have weapons of mass 
destruction, then a revealed cue that the dictator does not have nuclear weapons, or does not 
have chemical weapons, does not destabilize the pooling equilibrium by iterated elimination 
of strictly dominated strategies or by the intuitive criterion, as it is not the case that only a 
dictator that does not have any weapons at all can send such a signal or has an incentive to 
send such a signal. This suggests that the principle of pragmatic inference proposed here, 
saying that the limited information that is revealed should be considered as representative for 
all information, only applies if the pooling equilibrium has a particular form. Still, by 
evolutionary drift the receiver may get predisposed to interpret an out-of-equilibrium revealed 
cue that the sender does not have weapons of mass destruction, and a cue that she does have 
them, in the appropriate way. A separating equilibrium then still evolves from the pooling 










  244.2 Costly signaling 
 
Consider two drivers driving in opposite directions on the same road, and assume that they 
have common interests. Driver 1 can see whether or not there is a speed control ahead for 
driver 2. Most of the time, there is no speed control ahead. The only signal available for driver 
1 to send to driver 2 is to flash her headlights. But how should driver 2 interpret driver 1 
flashing her headlights? As flashing one’s headlights requires some effort, the most efficient 
outcome is that flashing one’s headlights means that there is a speed camera ahead. In this 
way, the effort of sending the signal is incurred as infrequently as possible. The principle of 
pragmatic inference applied here is that an unexpected signal means that something out of the 
ordinary is going on. (Un)marked states receive an (un)marked expression. This principle 
goes back to Horn and Zipf, and was game-theoretically treated among others by Parikh 
(1991, 2000, 20001) and Van Rooij (2004). 
Costly signaling common-interests model. There are two states of the world, L and M, and 
only actions L or M can be taken. In an essential feature of this game, we assume that state L 
is less frequent than state M, i.e.  M L    . The sender can choose to send any signal from a 
set of equally costly signals. As shown in Proposition 13, in terms of the driver example, there 
exists an efficient separating equilibrium where the first driver flashes her headlights only if 
there is a speed control, as well as an inefficient equilibrium where the first driver flashes her 
headlights only if there is no speed control ahead. Further, depending on the parameters, in 
the pooling equilibrium either the second driver drives slow or fast. 
 
 
Proposition 13. Consider the costly signaling common-interests model. Then an efficient 
separating equilibrium exists where Z sends the costly signal only in state L, along with an 
inefficient separating equilibrium where the Z sends a costly signal only in state M. In the 
pooling equilibrium, H does L when       
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, and does M when 
     
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. The Pareto-efficient equilibrium is the one where a signal gets 
sent in the infrequent state L. 
Proof: 
If      L L M L U L M M M U L H M L H M        , then a pooling equilibrium where M is 
always done exists, if         L L M L U L M M M U L H M L H M        , then a pooling 
equilibrium where L is always done exists. If the sender sends a signal in state L (M), then it is 
a best response for the receiver to take action L (M) when a signal is received, and to take 
action M (L) when a signal is not received. This response by the receiver in turn makes the 
specified sender strategy a best response. For the receiver, it does not matter which separating 
equilibrium is played. The sender is better off if the signal is only sent infrequently. 
QED 
 
We now again look at equilibrium selection arguments, to investigate whether the principle 
that a signal should be interpreted as referring to an out of the ordinary state indeed is 
predicted to apply. The arguments here are due to Van Rooij (2008) and De Jaegher (2008). 
In comparison with the costly-signaling conflict-of-interest model of Section 3.2, it should be 
noted that there are no strictly dominated strategies anymore, where certain types can never 
send certain signals. Instead, only the principle of equilibrium domination can be applied, 
where the comparison is made to what Z of a certain type could have obtained by playing 




Proposition 14. Consider the costly signaling conflict-of-interest model. 
Let       
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(i)  Pooling equilibria are not neologism proof (against efficient separating equilibria), do 
not meet the intuitive criterion, do not destabilize any separating equilibria and cannot 
be attained from them. 
(ii)  The inefficient separating equilibrium is neologism proof, meets the intuitive criterion, 
but does not destabilize pooling equilibria or the efficient separating equilibrium, and 
cannot be attained from them. 
(iii)  The efficient separating equilibrium is neologism proof, meets the intuitive criterion, 
destabilizes pooling equilibria but not efficient separating equilibria, and can be attained 
from pooling equilibria but not from the inefficient separating equilibrium. 
Let       
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(iv)  Pooling equilibria: not neologism proof (against inefficient separating equilibria), do not 
meet intuitive criterion, do not destabilize any separating equilibria and cannot be attained 
from them. 
(v) Inefficient separating equilibria: neologism proof, meet intuitive criterion, destabilize 
pooling equilibria but not efficient separating equilibria, can be attained from pooling 
equilibria but not from efficient separating equilibria. 
(vi)  Efficient separating equilibria: neologism proof, meet intuitive criterion, but do not 
destabilize pooling equilibria or inefficient separating equilibria, and cannot be attained 
from them. 
Proof: 
In general, any separating equilibrium is neologism proof and meets the intuitive criterion 
because no type can benefit from sending an out-of-equilibrium signal. Each sender type is 
already obtaining the preferred response in a separating equilibrium. As each signal is costly, 
at best the sender obtains exactly the same payoff by sending an out-of-equilibrium signal. A 
Pareto inefficient (efficient) equilibrium separating equilibrium is not attainable from a Pareto 
efficient (inefficient) separating equilibrium, as the receiver in the Pareto inefficient (efficient 
separating equilibrium does L (M) when not receiving a signal. 
(i)  If a costly signal already has a common meaning “do L” and if the receiver follows the 
advice contained in the signal, type M does not want to send it by    M L U M M U Z Z   
(equation (1)), but type L does by      L M U L L U Z Z   (equation (2)), so that the pooling 
equilibrium is not neologism proof. Given      M L U M M U Z Z   it is further equilibrium 
dominated for type M to send a signal (equation (4)). It follows by equation (5) that the 
pooling equilibrium does not meet the intuitive criterion and is destabilized by the 
efficient separating equilibrium. 
(ii) In any pooling equilibrium in this case, the receiver does M when not receiving a signal. 
The sender’s strategy of the inefficient separating equilibrium is not a best response to 
this, so that the inefficient separating equilibrium is not attainable from pooling equilibria. 
(iii)In any pooling equilibrium in this case, it is a best response for the receiver to do M when 
not receiving a signal and L when receiving a signal. The sender’s strategy of the efficient 
  26separating equilibrium is a best response to this receiver strategy, so that the efficient 
separating equilibrium is attainable from pooling equilibria. 
(iv)  If a costly signal already has a common meaning “do M” and if the receiver follows the 
advice contained in the signal, type L does not want to send it by     L M U L L U Z Z   
(equation (1)), but type M does by      M L U M M U Z Z   (equation (2)), so that the 
pooling equilibrium is not neologism proof. Given     L M U Z  it is further 
equilibrium dominated for type L to send a signal (equation (4)). It follows by equation (5) 
that the pooling equilibrium does not meet the intuitive criterion and is destabilized by the 
inefficient separating equilibrium. 
U L L Z 
(v) In any pooling equilibrium in this case, it is a best response for the receiver to do L when 
not receiving a signal and M when receiving a signal. The sender’s strategy of the 
inefficient separating equilibrium is a best response to this, so that the inefficient 
separating equilibrium is attainable from pooling equilibria. 
(vi)  In any pooling equilibrium in this case, it is a best response for the receiver to do L when 
not receiving a signal. The sender’s strategy of the efficient separating equilibrium is not a 
best response to this receiver strategy, so that the efficient separating equilibrium is not 
attainable from pooling equilibria. 
QED 
 
(dit keer te specifiek in termen van voorbeeld) 
 
In terms of the driver example, Proposition 14 suggests that the proposed principle of 
pragmatic inference only applies if in the pooling equilibrium, the second driver drives fast. 
This occurs e.g., if speed controls are infrequent. Even though it is not the case that only a 
driver who sees a speed camera ever wants to flash her headlights (no strict dominance), it is 
still the case that only a driver who sees a speed camera has an incentive to deviate from the 
pooling equilibrium and incur the cost of flashing her headlights. Yet, if in the pooling 
equilibrium the driver drives slow even though speed controls are infrequent, e.g., because 
traffic fines are very high, then by the same principle the second driver would flash her 
headlights most of the time, when no speed control is ahead. Thus, from the perspective of 
neologism proofness and of the intuitive criterion, the principle is rather to look at what 
sender has an incentive to deviate from the pooling equilibrium by incurring the cost of 
sending a signal. Nevertheless, a recent experiment (De Jaegher, Rosenkranz and Weitzel, 
2008) shows that even if in terms of the example in the pooling equilibrium the second driver 
drives slow, the efficient separating equilibrium is still played. This suggests that the 





Some weeks ago, a conference organizer invited an academic as a speaker at his conference, 
and the academic agreed to come. The night before the conference day, the organizer realizes 
that he has not heard from the academic since she agreed to come weeks ago. Even though the 
organizer and the academic have common interests, the organizer wonders how to interpret 
the academic’s silence. Does this simply mean that she will show up as agreed, and would she 
only have sent a new message to cancel her talk due to unforeseen circumstances? Or does her 
silence mean that she forgot about the conference, and is it the case that if she would not have 
forgotten, he would have received a re-confirmation from her right before the conference? 
  27An additional complication is that no matter whether the academic sends confirmation or 
cancellation messages, the message may get lost. But given that any message may get lost, the 
organizer may consider in what circumstances it is most costly for a message to get lost. If it 
is costly to schedule the academic when she does not show up (so that the audience might be 
left waiting) but not costly to have the academic present without her being able to hold her 
talk, it is efficient that a confirmation message is sent. In this way, the audience is never left 
waiting. If it is costly that the academic show up and finds that she cannot hold her talk but 
not costly for the audience that her talk is scheduled (because there are parallel sessions), it is 
efficient that a cancellation message is sent. In this way, the academic can always hold her 
talk if she is present. In general, as silence does not lead to mistakes (an e-mail will not be 
received if none was sent), no message should be sent in the case where it is important not to 
make mistakes. Sender and receiver then follow a pragmatic rule of being being unambiguous 
when it is important. 
Common-interests noisy signaling model. In the simplest model reflecting this story, there 
are only two states of the world, M and L, and two actions with the same label. Both sender 
and receiver want the label of the receiver’s action to be the same as the label of the state of 
the world. The sender can choose a signal from a set of signals. The signals, which may or 
may not be part of a rich common language, all get lost with the same probability. We only 
consider equilibria where the sender either sends a message or does not. 
 
Proposition 15. Consider the common-interests noisy signaling model. Let M be H’s best 
response in the pooling equilibrium. Then an efficient separating equilibrium exists where Z 
sends a noisy only in state L, along with an inefficient separating equilibrium where Z sends a 
noisy signal only in state M. 
Proof: 
           
    L L U M L U S M M U S S
L M U S L L U S S M M U
H L H H M
H H L H M
   













In Proposition 16, we now check to what extent equilibrium refinement arguments elect the 
Pareto-efficient separating equilibrium. We again leave out iterated elimination of strictly 
dominated strategies, and the intuitive criterion, as these both only work if there is a direct 
cost attached to sending a signal. 
 
 
Proposition 16. Consider the common-interests noisy signaling model. Let M be H’s best 
response in the pooling equilibrium. Then: 
(i)  The  pooling equilibria are not neologism proof against the efficient separating 
equilibrium, and cannot be attained from any of the separating equilibria. 
(ii) The inefficient separating equilibrium is neologism proof, but cannot be attained from 
pooling equilibria or from efficient separating equilibria. 
(iii)The efficient separating equilibria is neologism proof, cannot be attained from inefficient 
separating equilibria, but can be attained from pooling equilibria. 
Proof: 
In general, pooling equilibria cannot be attained from a separating equilibrium, and one type 
of separating equilibrium cannot be attained from the other. With respect to the pooling 
  28equilibrium, drift cannot cause the sender to prefer to stop sending signals. With respect to the 
other type of separating equilibrium, drift cannot cause the sender to prefer to reverse the 
circumstances where a signal is sent and not sent. All separating equilibria are neologism 
proof against the pooling equilibria, simply because an out-of-equilibrium neologism cannot 
lead to the undoing of separation. Equilibria were two messages are sent were not considered 
as part of the model 
Given that M is played in the pooling equilibrium, by equation (1), a sender in state M 
would not prefer to send a signal with commonly-known meaning “do L” if the receiver 
would follow this advice. By equation (2), the sender in state L does weakly prefer to send 
such a signal. However, by equation (1), a sender in state M only has a weak interest to send a 
signal with commonly-known meaning “do M”, given that M is already done in the pooling 
equilibrium. It follows that the pooling equilibrium is not neologism proof against the Pareto-
efficient separating equilibrium. 
Given that M is done in any pooling equilibrium, drift cannot cause the receiver to do M 
only when receiving a signal and to do L otherwise, but can cause the receiver to do L only 
when receiving a signal and M otherwise. 
QED 
 
Proposition 16 only shows that neologism proofness and attainability both predict that the 
efficient separating equilibrium will be played in case M is the best response in the pooling 
equilibrium. But this is a general result: by simply reversing all labels, it can be seen that the 
result also applies when L is played in the pooling equilibrium. In terms of the example at the 
beginning of this section, if the key consideration is that the audience is never left waiting, 
then an organizer who knows that the academic does not send any signals will not schedule 
the academic. For the same reason, it is efficient that the academic sends a confirmation. In 
this way, the audience is never left waiting (while she may show up at the conference to find 
out that her talk was canceled because her confirmation got lost). But given that her talk is 
canceled if she is known not communicate, the only thing that she can learn is to send a 
confirmation. While in neologism proofness and attainability, Pareto-efficiency is not the 
driving force, they happen to lead to Pareto-efficiency in this case, so that the pragmatic rule 





A doping agency performs doping tests on athletes, and the results of its tests can either be 
positive, negative, or inconclusive. The sports federation to which it reports prefers to suspend 
athletes with a positive test, to give athletes with an inconclusive test a warning, and to leave 
athletes with a negative test free. Unfortunately, the doping agency can only give the sports 
federation a yes answer or a no answer on whether the athlete uses doping, so that inevitably 
one of the two possible judgements of the doping agency needs to cover two states. The sports 
federation and the doping agency both hate to let dishonest athletes escape suspension. For 
this reason, they both prefer that athletes who test positive and inconclusive are suspended, 
and that only athletes with a negative test go free. When inferring what failure to report a 
positive test result means, the sports federation may conclude that the agency is following a 
pragmatic rule to “be precise when it is important”, i.e. to make sure that negative tests are 
only inferred for athletes who are certainly not positive. 
A related idea is found in a recent paper by Crémer et al. (2007), who show that it is 
efficient for firms to use precise, fine-tuned jargon in states of the world with which they are 
confronted frequently, and imprecise language in states of the world that are less frequent. 
  29The argument there, however, is one of design rather than coordination between a sender and 
a receiver. A much more sophisticated model is found in Jäger et al. (forthcoming), who study 
a common-interest signaling game with continuous states of the world defined over multiple 
dimensions (e.g., location on a plane) and with a finite number of signals. While most of the 
analysis concerns uniform distributions (all states are equally likely) and while the focus is on 
the form of equilibrium partitions (Voronoi tessellations), the authors also pay attention to 
non-uniform distributions, where in an example it is shown to be efficient that types with a 
larger mass in the distribution function have smaller partitions, whereas types with less mass 
have larger partitions. Yet, there are also inefficient equilibria, and the focus in our analysis is 
whether equilibrium refinements select the efficient equilibria. 
Common-interest imprecise signaling model. There are three states of the world L, M and 
R. Each player prefers that in each state, the action with the same label as the state is taken. 
Action R is taken in the pooling equilibrium, as well as when R and M are pooled. When M 
and L are pooled, action M is taken. 
 
Proposition 17. Consider the three-state three-action game with a set S (|S| ≥ 1) of noiseless, 
costless signals, where there are common interests. Let Z be constrained to use only a single 
signal in any separating equilibrium. Let       L R U L M U L L U Z Z Z   , 
   R L U R M U R R U Z Z Z    , and        M L U M R U M M U Z Z Z   . Further, let 
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and let           M R U M x U L R U L x U H H M H H L             R x U R R U H H R     for 
. Then in the pooling equilibrium, H does R. In the inefficient separating 
equilibrium,  Z pools states M and L (leading H to do M). In the efficient separating 
equilibrium, Z pools states M and R (leading H to do R). 
L M x , 
Proof: 
(i)  The pooling equilibrium takes this form by the fact that 
         M R U M x U L R U L x U H H M H H L             R x H  for 
L M x ,  . 
U R R UH R   
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H does M when getting a pooled signal. Given that      L R U L M U Z Z  , 
  R M Z , and  U R R UZ    M R U M M U Z Z  , Z prefers to tell the truth. 
(iii)  In the second type of equilibrium, R and M get pooled. By 
     
   M R R
R R
R M U R R U





 , H does R when getting a pooled signal. Given that 
  L R U L L U Z Z  ,     R L U R R U Z Z  , and      M L U M R U Z Z  , Z prefers to tell the 
truth. 
(iv)     
   R R
R R H  iff 
U M R U L L U
U M M U L M U
H R H M H L
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We now look at equilibrium selection arguments in this case. The pooling equilibrium can 
be eliminated, but both types of separating equilibria (the efficient as well as the inefficient 
  30one) seem equally likely to come forward. Neologism proofness does not work in selecting 
the efficient separating equilibrium because both types of equilibria make the sender better off 
compared to the pooling equilibrium. (We do not treat the neologism proofness of separating 
equilibria. If an additional signal is available, obviously a separating equilibrium will evolve 
where the three states are separated. The point of the exercise is that only a limited number of 
signals is available.) Additionally, the attainability argument does not work anymore either. 
Clearly, from a situation where in the pooling equilibrium R is always done, it may evolve 
that a signal is sent only in state L, or is sent both in state L and state M. Thus, while the 
argument for the efficient equilibrium seems intuitive, only the focal point argument selects 
the efficient equilibrium. In terms of the doping agency example, a pragmatic rule that the 
doping agency should only be precise when it is important to be precise (i.e. when the athlete 
certainly did not take doping) only works if it somehow creates a focal point.  
 
 
Proposition 18. Consider the game in Proposition 17. 
(i)  Pooling equilibria: not neologism proof against both efficient and inefficient separating 
equilibria, but cannot be attained from any of the separating equilibria. 
(ii)  Inefficient separating equilibria: neologism proof, can be attained from pooling 
equilibria. 
(iii)  Efficient separating equilibria: neologism proof, can be attained from pooling equilibria. 
Proof: 
(i)  Consider any pooling equilibrium. First, let H receive a signal from a common language 
saying that either M or L occurs. If the signal is followed up, following equation (1), Z in 
R does not have any strong incentive to send such a signal, Z in M or L do (equation (2)). 
Second, let H receive a signal from a common language saying that L occurs. If the signal 
is followed up, given that     M L U M R U Z Z   and     R L U U Z , neither Z in R 
nor Z in M have an incentive to send such a signal, but Z in L does have an incentive to 
send such a signal. 
R R Z 
(ii)  In the pooling equilibrium, it is a best response to the receiver to adopt towards an out-of-
equilibrium signal the strategy of the inefficient or of the efficient separating equilibria. It 









As the paper has shown, game-theoretic pragmatics can be applied not only to costly 
signals, but also to noisy, imprecise, and to direct signals. In part, we have shown this by 
reinterpreting or adapting the existing literature, but we have also shown in simple examples 
how some gaps in the literature concerning in particular direct and noisy signals could be 
filled. This was done in terms of very basic models, suggesting that additional insights can be 
gained by studying more sophisticated models. Moreover, the models we treat have each time 
considered revelatory aspects of signals, and their cost, noisiness and imprecision separately. 
Yet, signals typically may have all these aspects at the same time. Thus, it may be insightful 
to also consider models where signals have several of these aspects at the same time. 
As our analysis shows, standard equilibrium refinements such as neologism proofness or the 
intuitive criterion do not always predict that efficient separating equilibria are more likely to 
  31be played than inefficient ones. Indeed, in some instances these arguments predict the 
inefficient separating equilibrium to be played. The same applies for evolutionary arguments. 
This creates a tension with the focal-point argument, saying that the efficiency of a separating 
equilibrium itself creates a focal point, so that the efficient separating equilibrium is played. 
These contradictory predictions are interesting from the viewpoint of laboratory experiments, 
where the games can be replicated with pecuniary payoffs, to test which of the equilibrium 
selection arguments has cutting ground. 
Finally, we are aware that under the influence of similar trends within economics, game-
theoretical pragmatics is starting to move into behavioral game theory (see e.g., Franke, 
2011). While we find this a sensible approach, as shown in this paper we have not explored all 
insights we can gain from rational models yet. One could say that we do not go through that 
phase, and go straight to the behavioral models, without lingering in the rational ones. Yet, we 
believe that the rational models are needed as a  b a s i s ,  b e f o r e  w e  can start to construct 
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